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Abstract— Viruses and worms are one of the most common
causes of security problems in computer systems today. Users
attempt to protect machines from such attacks by using anti-
virus programs and firewalls, with a mixed record of success at
best. One of the main problems with these solutions is that they
rely on manual configurations and human intervention, and may
fail to react in time to defend against an attack.
We present a cooperative immunization system that helps
defend against these types of attacks. The nodes in our system
cooperate and inform each other of ongoing attacks and the
actions necessary to defend. To evaluate our proposal, we discuss
a simple virus model and evaluate our system using simulation.
Our measurements show that our algorithm is more effective
against viruses and more robust against malicious participants
in the immunization system.
I. INTRODUCTION
“Worms”, introduced in [1] and inspired by a science-fiction
novel [2], are self-replicating, segmented, distributed systems.
If one segment of a worm is killed or fails, then the other
segments detect the failure and spawn a new copy of that
segment on a new node. Worms were originally considered
a benign paradigm to ensure the longevity of distributed
applications, and originally ran only on machines that exported
either general or special purpose remote execution facilities.
Two factors have changed both the perception and reality
of worms to be largely malignant platforms for distributed
applications. First, even when programmers’ motives are pure,
small bugs can cause worms to proliferate and grow more
rapidly than desired and overwhelm the resources of a dis-
tributed remote-execution system, as in fact occurred on the
Internet in November 1988. Second, most worms or viruses
no longer use legitimate remote execution interfaces to acquire
a bounded number of nodes. Rather, they exploit bugs and
loopholes and install themselves on machines where they are
unwanted. They often try to grow without bound, attempting
to infect every machine accessible to them. In the best case,
these viruses simply steal cycles. However, they can easily
have more destructive payloads: delete files and/or otherwise
damage the host machines, steal sensitive data, participate in
a denial of service attack, etc.
Reference [3] makes a credible case that viruses can cause
truly immense damage to the network-dependent commer-
cial, military, and social services infrastructure of nations
throughout the world. That paper, and others, outlined a future
world in which vigorous defense against viruses would rapidly
detect virus attacks, and produce detectors, disinfectants, and
antidotes. Such a world would likely contain the cyberspace
equivalent of a Center for Disease Control, that would identify
outbreaks, rapidly analyze pathogens, and distribute (authen-
ticated) methods for detecting the virus and fighting the in-
fection through both disinfection and immunization. Although
such a Cyber Center for Disease Control (CCDC) can provide
detection signatures as well as disinfection and immunization
procedures for a given virus, it does not address the delivery
mechanism for such measures. Application of preventive mea-
sures is likely to occur on human time-scales, but particularly
aggressive viral attacks may be able to cover the entire Internet
in a matter of minutes. Therefore it seems clear that some form
of automated response must be employed.
Recent work has focused on such automated distributed
mechanisms for containment [4] and disinfection [5] that may
be able to spread fast enough to mitigate the effect of the
virus. Some believe that there is reason for guarded optimism.
Studies have shown that fairly low-levels of immunization [6]
or low-level responses [7] can be enough to contain the virus
or significantly slow the spread of the virus. The automated
response mechanisms may be able to scan, filter, and disinfect
or immunize quickly enough to prevent runaway infection and
allow human intervention.
Our work is prompted by two observations that make earlier
analyses that focus on individual viruses seem incomplete.
First, while new viruses will continue to be created, zombie
strains of old viruses will continue to circulate around the
Internet by script kiddies. Further, a measurable fraction of
Internet hosts will not bother to upgrade or patch to eliminate
security bugs (or, worse, regress to vulnerable versions). Thus,
the old viruses are still potentially virulent. Consequently, any
proposed defense mechanism must be evaluated in the context
of handling potentially many active viruses simultaneously.
Second, distributed viral response mechanisms require some
degree of trust between the automated agents cooperating
in the response. In the best of times there are at most an
insignificant minority of nodes in the Internet that any given
node expects to be trustworthy; during a virus attack it is
unreasonable to trust any particular node. Thus, any proposed
defense mechanism must be robust in the face of inaccurate
information from some of its peers.
These observations expose several significant problems that
must be dealt with. Any node that responds to a potential virus
carries a cost: a node has finite resources and therefore can
only actively engage a limited number of viruses at a time.
Deciding to counter one virus entails ignoring some other
virus. Further, filtering packets containing potential threats
carries the possibility of false positives: legitimate traffic may
be blocked, too. In the absence of cost, the best response to
a potential virus attack is to flood the network as rapidly as
possible, causing as many cooperating agents to respond at
once. The main question is simply whether the response is
quick enough to stifle the virus. In the presence of a cost
model, however, we still need to respond quickly, but no more
quickly than necessary. A false alarm, whether malicious or
unintended, can trigger an effective denial-of-service attack by
the response mechanism itself!
This paper investigates a distributed response mechanism
that responds quickly to real viruses and does not over-react
to false alarms. Moreover, the response mechanism must be
robust against malicious agents spreading false information
and be able to manage its resources even when many distinct
viruses are active at any time.
Our basic approach is to share information about the ob-
served rate of infection for each virus, verifying that new
reports are not incompatible with our own empirical obser-
vations. We use a simple model of the virulence of a virus to
(probabilistically) determine which viruses to respond to. We
present an instance of such an algorithm, called COVERAGE
(for COoperative Virus Response AlGorithm), and evaluate
its effectiveness through large-scale simulation. Reference [5]
comments that strategies effective against fast viruses will
likely be ineffective against slow viruses, and that reducing
sensitivity to false alarms increases the risk in real virus
attacks. Although our results should be considered preliminary
in the absence of long-term comprehensive testing and real de-
ployment, they show that by dynamically modeling the spread
of the virus through shared global information, COVERAGE
can maintain effectiveness against both fast and slow viruses
while reducing costs under a barrage of false alarms.
II. RELATED WORK
Computer viruses have been studied extensively over the last
several decades. Cohen was the first to define and describe
computer viruses in their present form. In [8], he gave a
theoretical basis for the spread of computer viruses. The strong
analogy between biological and computer viruses led Kephart
et al. [9] to investigate the propagation of computer viruses
based on epidemiological models. They extend the standard
epidemiological model by placing it on a directed graph, and
use a combination of analysis and simulation to study its
behavior. They conclude that if the rate at which defense
mechanisms detect and remove viruses is sufficiently high,
relative to the rate at which viruses spread, they can prevent
widespread virus propagation.
The Code Red worm [10] was analyzed extensively in [11].
The authors of that work conclude that even though epidemic
models can be used to study the behavior of Internet worms,
they are not accurate enough because they cannot capture
some specific properties of the environment these operate in:
the effect of human countermeasures against worm spreading
(i.e., patching, filtering, disconnecting, etc.), and the slowing
down of the worm infection rate due to the worm’s impact on
Internet traffic and infrastructure. They derive a new general
Internet worm model called two-factor worm model, which
they then validate in simulations that match the observed
Code Red data available to them. Their analysis seems to be
supported by the data on Code Red propagation in [12].
Moore et al [4] describes a design space of worm contain-
ment systems using three parameters: reaction time, contain-
ment strategy, and deployment scenario. The authors use a
combination of analytic modeling and simulation to describe
how each of these design factors impacts the dynamics of
a worm epidemic. Their analysis suggests that there are
significant gaps in containment defense mechanisms that can
be employed, and that considerable more research (and better
coordination between ISPs and other entities) is needed. Their
analysis focuses exclusively on containment mechanisms (i.e.,
network filtering), which they consider the only viable defense
mechanism. We believe that other types of automated defense
mechanisms will eventually be invented, if only because con-
tainment mechanisms can severely impact service availability.
Wang et al [6] presented some very encouraging results for
slowing down the spread of viruses. It simulated the propa-
gation of virus infections through certain types of networks,
coupled with partial immunization. Their findings show that
even with low levels of immunization, the infection slows
down significantly. Those experiments looked at a single virus.
Our work investigates the detection of multiple viruses when
there is no a priori knowledge of which viruses may attack.
One approach for detecting new email viruses was described
in [13], which keeps track of email attachments as they are
exchanged between users through a set of collaborating email
servers that forward a subset of their data to a central data
warehouse and correlation server. Only attachments with a
high frequency of appearance are deemed suspicious; fur-
thermore, the email exchange patterns among users are used
to create models of normal behavior. Deviation from such
behavior (e.g., a user sending a particular attachment to a
large number of other users at the same site, to which she has
never sent email before) raises an alarm. Information about
dangerous attachments can be sent to the email servers, which
then filter these out. One interesting result is that their system
only need be deployed to a small number of email servers,
such that it can examine a miniscule amount of email traffic
(relative to all email exchanged on the Internet) — they claim
0.1% — before they can determine virus outbreaks and be
able to build good user behavior models.
Reference [14] proposes the use of “predator” viruses that
spread in much the same way malicious viruses do but try
to eliminate their designated “victim” viruses. The authors
show that predators can be made to perform their tasks without
flooding the network and consuming all available resources.
However, designers of predators would have to find their own
exploits (or safeguard exploits for future use), which is not an
attractive proposition. One encouraging result of their work
was that the number of initial predators needed to contain a
highly-aggressive virus could be as small as 2,000.
The work most relevant to our is that of Nojiri et al. [5].
They present a cooperative response algorithm where edge-
routers share attack reports with a small set of other edge-
routers. Edge-routers update their alert level based on the
shared attack reports and decide whether to enable traffic
filtering and blocking for a particular attack. We compare
the performance of this approach against COVERAGE in
Section V.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In analyzing the behavior of our response mechanism
through simulation, we necessarily make certain simplifica-
tions in our model of how viruses, hosts, switches, and
our detection mechanism behave. The following subsections
describe in turn these parts of our model.
A. Modeling Attackers
We use a fairly simple model to describe the behavior of
potential attackers (viruses) that we consider in this research.
After infecting a node, a virus attempts to infect other nodes;
it may attempt to only infect a (small) fixed number of other
nodes, or exhibit a greedier behavior. For our purposes, the
distinction between the two types is simply in the probability
of detection of a probe or attack by a detector. A virus may
exhibit high locality of infection (i.e., probing and attacking
nodes based on network-topological criteria, such as “adja-
cent” IP addresses), or could use a random (or seemingly
random) targeting mechanism, e.g., using a large hit-list, or
some pseudo-random sequence for picking the next address
to attack. We expect that viruses that exhibit high locality
are more difficult to detect using an Internet-wide distributed
detection mechanism, but easier to do so on a local basis.
We can completely characterize a virus by the rate at
which it attempts to infect other nodes and by the fraction
of local attempts it makes. All attacks on susceptible nodes
are successful, and in our simulation a virus never attempts to
attack a non-existent node. (Therefore, our viruses are more
virulent than equally aggressive viruses in the real world).
There are responses associated by the CCDC with each
virus. We assume that by the time a node has enough informa-
tion to decide to activate the virus detection mechanism, the
CCDC has already disseminated the response to the node. The
response for each detectable virus may have several optional
components. An attack detection mechanism based on known
virus signatures. In its simplest form, this is a packet filter;
more complicated detection mechanisms (e.g., checking for
viruses inside email attachments) may also be part of the
detection component. An infection detection mechanism also
based on known virus signatures. This is a potentially expen-
sive operation that may involve inspection of a node’s disk
or memory system. It can detect infections in already infected
nodes. A disinfectant mechanism that can remove a virus from
an already infected node. Finally, a immunization mechanism
that can “protect” or immunize a node from subsequent attacks
by this virus.
B. Network Topology
Our simulation topology is dictated by assumptions we
make about the vulnerabilities and powers of network nodes
with respect to virus attacks. We assume that, as a general
rule, routers/switches are less likely to be infected by a virus,
mostly because of the limited set of potentially-exploitable
services they offer. Consequently, we assume that only hosts
are susceptible to infection.
While considerable advantage can be had by exploiting the
great levels of traffic aggregation seen in routers closer to the
network core, it is unlikely that such nodes can actively check
for viruses without significantly affecting their performance.
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, we assume that the
only nodes in our system capable of scanning packet sequences
for potential viruses are end-hosts or last-hop routers.
Our model of the network topology, then, consists entirely
of a collection of subnets, or LANs, containing some number
of hosts. Each subnet is connected to the global network
through a single router. All routers are connected together
in a single cloud where each router can address and forward
packets to each other directly. End-hosts can only see traffic
destined for themselves. Routers can inspect all traffic to or
from their associated LAN.
It is likely that some organizations contain multiple subnets
that frequently communicate among themselves. Therefore we
collect together several subnets into a domain. A domain cap-
tures particular communication patterns but has no structural
impact on the topology for simulation.
C. State of Nodes
A node in our environment can be in one of three states
with respect to a virus: susceptible, protected, or immune.
A susceptible node can be either infected or uninfected.
Susceptible nodes will become infected if subjected to an
attack. Protected nodes may be infected or uninfected, but
only if the detection module does not have the ability to
detect and disinfect an infected machine. A protected node
will not become infected as long as the protection mechanism
(typically, a detection module that screens incoming packets
or email) is in place. An immune node does not have the
vulnerability exploited by the virus (either because it never
had it — e.g., different operating system — or because it was
patched). Clearly, it is better to have an immunized node than
to be forced to disinfect it after a successful virus attack. We
assume that immune nodes are uninfected.
D. Operations
A node can monitor traffic and, for each virus, it can either
ignore the virus or perform one or more of the following
operations: collect and exchange information about a virus,
scan for a virus, or filter viruses.
We assume that there is a cost inherent in checking for virus
signatures. That is, a node cannot be actively “on the lookout”
for an arbitrary number of viruses without adversely affecting
its performance. (Some experimental measurements of such
real-world limits are given in [15]). Edge-routers are more
likely to be constrained by high packet rates, and therefore
limited in the amount of scanning they can perform. Hosts
can scan for more viruses without interfering with their (lower)
packet rate, but, on the other hand, have work other than packet
forwarding to perform. In either case there is an upper bound
on the number of viruses a node can scan for.
We assume that nodes periodically exchange information
about viral infections. Although the per-virus cost of such an
exchange is low, we assume that the number of known viruses
exceeds the amount of information that can be reasonably
exchanged at any given time. Thus, actively exchanging infor-
mation about a virus incurs a cost, albeit lower than scanning.
Routers can additionally scan for viruses on all packets
travelling to or from their LAN (and drop when necessary). We
further assume that if a router detects a rampant viral infection
for a virus that has an associated disinfectant component, the
router can invoke a disinfection operation (perhaps alerting an
administrator) on all the nodes in its LAN.
E. Model of Anti-virus Epidemic
Each node participating in the anti-virus response must
make certain decisions: (a) the rate at which it polls other
local nodes for virus information, (b) the rate at which it polls
other remote nodes, chosen at random, for virus information,
(c) whether, for each virus, to collect information about it, (d),
whether to include that information in virus exchange packets,
and (e) whether to scan for the virus (collecting the results of
those scans as part of the local information for that virus).
IV. COVERAGE: THE COOPERATIVE VIRUS RESPONSE
ALGORITHM
COVERAGE tries to balance the cost of scanning and
filtering packets for a specific virus against the benefit of
detecting, other, real viruses in several ways.
First, COVERAGE models the virulence of viruses and
ranks them accordingly. With probability proportional to their
virulence, COVERAGE decides in rank order whether to
actively scan for the virus or not. It stops making deci-
sions, and scans no more viruses, once the scanning schedule
consumes the entire scanning budget available. Second, each
COVERAGE agent exchanges information about the state of
a virus with other cooperating agents in order to construct a
model of the virus and determine whether incoming reports are
empirically consistent with the observed state of the network.
Third, COVERAGE agents determine their polling rate to
maximize the probability of seeing enough viruses to confirm
the current local estimate of the virus state, while reducing the
probability that communication will add no new knowledge to
either of the participants. We now describe the algorithm in
more detail.
A. COVERAGE algorithm
Agent communication. Each COVERAGE agent polls
other agents, selected randomly. Assuming that only a small
fraction of the nodes are reporting false information, a ran-
domly selected node is more likely to be trustworthy than a
node that actively contacts us — a small number of malicious
nodes may try to flood the rest of the network. At each poll, the
sender reads the response and updates its local state variables
to track the operation of the cooperative response mechanism
and the status of the network in terms of observed attacks.
First, it records whether the remote agent is actively scan-
ning. This allows the agent to estimate the fraction of agents
in the network that are actively scanning for a particular virus.
Second, it updates estimates of possible infections e.g., the
fraction of infected nodes for each virus. We distinguish two
types of estimates: direct and remote. Direct estimates are
updated based on whether each remote agent has directly
observed an attack (either to itself or, if a router, to a node in its
LAN). Remote estimates are updated based on the fraction of
infected nodes as estimated by the remote agent (the “direct”
estimates of the remote agent).
Periodic updates. At regular intervals each COVERAGE
agent updates its state based on the information received since
the last update. To track the progress of the infection each
COVERAGE agent maintains a smoothed history for each type
of estimate (direct and remote), each as exponentially decaying
averages with varying time constants, to approximate recent
infection rate, past rate, and background rate.
Using these estimates, an agent can compute the fraction
of nodes believed to be infected as well as the growth of the
infection, assuming exponential growth1. If pn is the fraction
of infected nodes at timestep n and α is the growth rate, the
progress of the infection at timesteps n + 1 and n + 2 is
expected to be:
pn+1 = pn(1 + α), pn+2 = pn(1 + α)2, . . .
Taking the direct estimates pd1, pd2, and pd3 maintained by the
agent, we can obtain estimates αd? and pd?. We calculate the
virulence, vd, of a virus as the estimated number of timesteps
needed by the virus to infect the entire network. This estimate
is: vd = − log pd?/ log(1 + αd?).
Using the same method as above the agent can also compute
αr?, p
r
? and vr based on the remote estimates.
Scanning/filtering. Given the estimates an agent can decide
whether it needs to scan for a given virus. There is a basic,
low level of scanning for every virus. When a virus becomes
active the scanning rate may increase. In the general case,
the agent can sort viruses in order of their virulence vd and
decide whether to scan for each virus, in turn, stopping when
the scanning budget is filled. (In our simulation, we only scan
viruses whose vd is below threshold.)
An inactive agent, A, may also start scanning seemingly
low-virulence viruses, if enough other agents claim the virus
is virulent, and A finds that the fraction of scanning nodes
is too low to detect virus activity in a single timestep at the
1We assume all growth is exponential for the purpose of deciding whether
to trigger a reaction. We believe that linear growth worms can be detected by
humans, and need not be countered by an automatic, distributed, algorithm. If
our assumption is incorrect and growth is, in practice, sub-exponential then we
recover naturally because we observe a decrease in α and gradually back-off
as the predicted “virulence” of the virus drops.
current polling rate. The test is whether n (simply the fraction
of agents that were polled and found to be scanning in the last
interval) is less than twice the estimated fraction of infected
hosts (e.g., if n < 2pr?). Similarly, if the agent is active but
n > pr? then it decides to stop. The agent also stops scanning
if αr? approaches 0. This ensures that the fraction of scanning
agents is bounded if there is insignificant progress for a given
infection or if the infection is small compared to the number
of actively scanning agents. Such heuristics are essential for
controlling the behavior of the algorithm, keeping the response
mechanism “ahead” of the virus but also limiting the damage
and cost when malicious agents spread false information.
Polling rate. An agent communicates with agents within
the same domain at a constant, high rate, as the cost of intra-
domain communication is assumed to be very small. Inter-
domain communication is generally more expensive; agents
therefore need to adapt the rate of polling remote agents,
avoiding excessive communication unless necessary for coun-
tering an attack. When there is no virus activity, agents poll at
a pre-configured minimum rate (at least an order of magnitude
lower than the rate for intra-domain communication). An agent
periodically adapts the remote polling rate if vr is less than
a given threshold. The new rate is set so that the agent
polls 1/(pr?)2 remote agents in each update interval, unless
this rate exceeds a pre-configured maximum rate. This is
used to increase the polling rate when the remote estimate
indicates that an attack is imminent (but not yet reflected in
the direct estimate). If the more recent direct estimate pdn is
non-zero, then the polling rate is increased so that at least a
few samples can be collected in each update interval. Finally,
if the estimated virus population pr? is very small (e.g., < 10%)
and the estimated virus growth rate is close to zero, the agent
throttles back its remote polling rate to the minimum rate.
These adjustments are always performed on the polling side.
We avoid changing the state or behavior of the polled agent to
reduce the risks associated with malicious agents. Otherwise
they could spread false information and raise false alarms more
effectively by increasing their own communication rate.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We focus on the behavior of COVERAGE in response to a
single virus. We model the impact of multiple active viruses
by specifying a threshold under which a virus will not have
high enough priority to be scheduled in the scanning budget.
If many viruses are active then the threshold will be a small
number, such as 5 (recall that the virulence is a measure of
how many measurement intervals it will take before the virus
has covered the entire Internet). Unless the current virus is
poised to conquer the entire net at its current rate of growth
from its current coverage within threshold intervals, it will
not have high enough priority to be scheduled in the scanning
budget. We compare the performance of our algorithm to the
NRL03 algorithm described in [5].
A. Results
An example run of the COVERAGE algorithm against a
virus is shown in Figure 1. One can see the initial stage of
the infection and the response of the algorithm: the virus
manages to infect roughly 10% of the hosts; cooperation
between COVERAGE agents results in a rapid activation of
filtering on roughly 60% of the network effectively eliminating
the virus. Soon after stopping the attack, the COVERAGE
agents deactivate scanning/filtering.
We simulate a simple, relatively small network of 100,000
edge-routers, each connected to 8 hosts. The network contains
2,000 domains consisting of 50 edge-routers each. We examine
the performance of the COVERAGE algorithm against the
NRL03 algorithm. For the COVERAGE algorithm, we set the
local-domain polling interval to 1.8 seconds , the maximum
and minimum remote polling intervals to 6 seconds and 1.8
seconds respectively. For both algorithms we assume that 4%
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Fig. 1. Fractions of infected hosts and scanning edge-routers over time.
Our analysis uses two key metrics. In the case of a virus
attack we are interested in the maximum fraction of infected
hosts. In the case where a set of malicious attempt to spread
false information to confuse the system, we are interested in
the maximum number of false scanning/filtering edge-routers.
The maximum fraction of infected hosts for different virus
infection rates is shown in Figure 2. We see that COVERAGE
is significantly more effective than NRL03 for slow and
medium-fast viruses but the relative benefit is reduced for
faster viruses. NRL03 achieves the same maximum infection
independent of virus infection rate because alert communica-
tion is triggered by virus scan events and follows a push model.
In contrast, communication rate in COVERAGE is bounded
and rate adaptation is delayed. This has been a deliberate
design choice in an attempt to make the algorithm robust
against false information from malicious nodes.
We also examine how COVERAGE and NRL03 perform
in a setting involving a small fraction of malicious partici-
pants that attempt to spread false information. The measured
maximum number of false scanning/filtering nodes for a given
fraction of malicious hosts is presented in Figure 3. We see
that COVERAGE is significantly more robust to malicious
nodes compared to NRL03. Considering the results of Figure 2
it becomes clear that for both algorithms there’s a trade-



































































Fig. 3. Maximum fraction of false scanning edge-routers.
against malicious participants. The results show that while
NLR03 is bound to perform poorly in one of the two metrics,
COVERAGE achieves a more balanced trade-off. We believe
that this is a valuable property for our approach.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PLANS
We have examined how cooperative pooling of information
can slow the spread of malicious viruses in the Internet. We
have described an algorithm that allows cooperating agents to
share information about such attacks and use this information
for controlling the behavior of detection and filtering re-
sources. What makes the design of such systems difficult is the
need to perform well without fully trusting global information.
This is crucial as full trust could result in costly false alarms
if a fraction of the participating agents are malicious. We have
proposed one solution to this problem, based on the idea of
carefully sampling of global state to validate claims made
by individual participants. Simulation results confirm that this
method is effective in limiting the damage of virus attacks and
that it is robust against attacks by malicious participants.
There are several directions for further experimentation.
First, in this paper, we have focused on reducing the cost of
scanning without describing much of our efforts on reducing
the communication cost of polling. We have algorithms that
should reduce communication cost without measurably reduc-
ing effectiveness of the anti-virus mechanism (it is possible
to significantly back-off polling rate when the polls do not
significantly change the state variables). These algorithms have
not been refined by experimentation, nor extensively tested
yet. Second, more experimentation is needed to examine the
performance of COVERAGE in the case of multiple, perhaps
simultaneously active viruses. Due to space considerations,
this paper simply assumes that many COVERAGE nodes are
occupied by higher-virulence viruses, and that we must reserve
processing cycles to deal with lower virulence viruses, too.
Much work remains to be done in improving the actual choices
each node makes of which set of viruses to monitor. Finally, it
is necessary to consider a richer network model involving end-
hosts and core-routers as well as more representative network
topologies.
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